Testing the boundaries of subnational diplomacy: the international climate action of local and regional governments by Setzer, Joana
  
Joana Setzer 
Testing the boundaries of subnational 
diplomacy: the international climate action 
of local and regional governments 
 
Article (Accepted version) 
(Refereed) 
 
 
 
Original citation: 
Setzer, Joana (2015) Testing the boundaries of subnational diplomacy: the international climate 
action of local and regional governments. Transnational Environmental Law, 4 (02). pp. 319-337. 
ISSN 2047-1025  
 
DOI: 10.1017/S2047102515000126 
 
© 2015 Cambridge University Press 
 
This version available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/64453/ 
 
Available in LSE Research Online: November 2015 
 
LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output of the 
School. Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual 
authors and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print one copy of any 
article(s) in LSE Research Online to facilitate their private study or for non-commercial research. 
You may not engage in further distribution of the material or use it for any profit-making activities 
or any commercial gain. You may freely distribute the URL (http://eprints.lse.ac.uk) of the LSE 
Research Online website.  
 
This document is the author’s final accepted version of the journal article. There may be 
differences between this version and the published version.  You are advised to consult the 
publisher’s version if you wish to cite from it. 
 
 
 
<Article> 
 
Testing the boundaries of subnational diplomacy: The 
international climate action of local and regional 
governments 
 
 
Joana Setzer* 
 
 
Abstract 
In the past years a number of local and regional governments around the world have 
started to engage in a real international or ‘paradiplomatic’ climate agenda. While the 
multilevel governance (MLG) approach advanced the examination of the actors and 
levels involved in climate governance, there is within this body of literature a limited 
consideration of the legal capacity of non-state actors to act across scales. This article 
addresses this gap and examines the potential limitations imposed on subnational 
diplomacy by international and domestic legal orders. The article draws upon the case 
of Brazil where, despite the constitutional limitations for the involvement of subnational 
governments in international relations, paradiplomacy was termed ‘federative 
diplomacy’ and institutionalized within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and within the 
Presidency of the Republic. The article shows that the diplomatic activity of local and 
regional governments is still constrained by international and domestic legal 
frameworks. If cities and regions are to help addressing the inadequacies of the 
international climate regime, then domestic and international legal frameworks will 
need to further accommodate subnational diplomatic activities. 
 
Keywords: Subnational diplomacy; Paradiplomacy; Climate change; Multilevel 
governance; Transnational networks; Brazil 
 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Local and regional governments across the world have become key actors in global 
climate governance. These subnational governments adopt progressive climate change 
                                                             
* 
Grantham Institute on Climate Change and the Environment, London School of Economics and Political 
Science (LSE), London (United Kingdom). 
Email: j.setzer@lse.ac.uk 
I am grateful for the contributions given by the two anonymous reviewers and by the editors of this journal to 
earlier versions of this paper. 
laws and policies1 and establish their own emissions trading systems.2 In addition, 
subnational governments are undertaking a real international agenda on climate 
change. Such a trend cannot be taken for granted. Governmental institutions are 
generally constituted to operate at speciﬁc jurisdictional levels, and they legislate and 
act within their respective territorial levels. Why then are local and regional 
governments engaging in the global governance of climate change? Some answers to 
this question have been given by the multilevel governance (MLG) literature. 
Researchers in this field explore the multiple jurisdictions in which climate governance 
occurs, and provide a number of explanations for why subnational governments get 
involved in climate action. This body of literature has advanced the understanding of 
some of the drivers and outcomes of subnational participation in climate governance, 
but it takes for granted the legal competence of subnational entities to undertake 
international relations. Further research is needed to understand the legal scope and 
limitations of subnational climate diplomacy.  
 
This article examines the legal context in which subnational diplomacy takes place. It 
argues that despite the apparent fluidity involved in multilevel governance systems, a 
discussion of the expanding role of local and regional governments in international 
relations requires consideration of the legal basis for this expansion. The diplomatic 
activity of local and regional governments is still constrained by international and 
domestic legal frameworks. Ultimately, the limits to subnational diplomacy are defined 
by the type of activity undertaken and the domestic understanding of whether such 
activity interferes with national legislation or not. The article shows that, if cities and 
regions are to help addressing the inadequacies of the international climate regime, 
then domestic and international legal frameworks will need to further accommodate 
subnational diplomatic activities.  
 
The paper draws upon the case of paradiplomatic activities undertaken by subnational 
governments in Brazil. Despite constitutional limitations on subnational governments’ 
involvement in international relations, the diplomatic agendas carried out by Brazilian 
states and municipalities were termed ‘federative diplomacy’ and institutionalized 
                                                             
1 There are several investigations of subnational policies addressing climate change. For the United states 
(US) and Canada see H. Selin & S.D. VanDeveer, Changing Climates in North American Politics: Institutions, 
Policymaking, and Multilevel Governance (The MIT Press, 2009). For Australia, see J. Peel, L. Godden & R.J. 
Keenan, ‘Climate Change Law in an Era of Multi-level Governance’ (2012) 1(2) Transnational 
Environmental Law, pp. 245-80. For Europe, see H. Bulkeley, Cities and Climate Change (Routledge, 2013) 
and H. Bulkeley & K. Kern, ‘Local Government and the Governing of Climate Change in Germany and the 
UK’ (2006) 43(12) Urban Studies, pp. 2237-59. For a wider spectrum of climate action undertaken by 
cities around the world, see V.C. Broto & H. Bulkeley, ‘A Survey of Urban Climate Change Experiments in 
100 Cities’ (2013) 23(1) Global Environmental Change, pp. 92-102; and T. Lee & C. Koski, ‘Mitigating 
Global Warming in Global Cities: Comparing Participation and Climate Change Policies of C40 Cities’ 
(2014) 16(5) Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis: Research and Practice, pp. 1-18. For a broader view of 
transnational climate governance see K.W. Abbott, ‘Strengthening the Transnational Regime Complex for 
Climate Change’ (2014) 3(1) Transnational Environmental Law, pp. 57-88.  
2 The first regional emissions trading systems were established in the US. The Regional Greenhouse Gas 
Initiative (RGGI) stimulated interest in regional emission trading systems, with two further regional 
schemes – the Midwestern Accord and the Western Climate Initiative (WCI) cap-and-trade schemes. More 
recently, Chinese provinces have established a pilot carbon emissions trading scheme. See L. Wu, H. Qian 
& J. Li, ‘Advancing the Experiment to Reality: Perspectives on Shanghai Pilot Carbon Emissions Trading 
Scheme’ (2014) 75(C) Energy Policy, pp. 22-30. 
within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and within the Presidency of the Republic. 
Drawing upon this case study, the article looks at the ways through which subnational 
governments are challenging pre-established legal competencies.  
 
The article is divided into five sections. Following this introduction, Section 2 presents 
the MLG framework and the literature on multilevel climate governance, and some of its 
shortcomings in investigating subnational governments’ international climate action. 
Section 3 examines the international and domestic legal limitations on subnational 
governments’ international relations. Section 4 considers the case of Brazil and how the 
Presidency of the Republic and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs are dealing with the 
engagement of subnational governments in international relations. The article 
concludes with a summary of the findings and of its contributions. 
 
 
 
2. MULTILEVEL GOVERNANCE AND CLIMATE CHANGE 
 
Governance across different levels of social organization has attracted growing 
analytical attention in the past decades. In the 1960s, Vincent Ostrom, Charles M. 
Tiebout and Robert Warren formulated the concept of polycentric systems to study the 
governance of metropolitan areas.3 The polycentric approach described the conditions 
and normative implications of diffusion of authority across multiple, overlapping and 
fluid jurisdictions. Expanding this approach to the climate realm, Elinor Ostrom argued 
that the international regime is one piece of a complex puzzle, and small scale 
governments can help build the trust and commitment needed to overcome collective 
action failures. A polycentric approach to climate change, therefore, encourages 
experimental efforts at multiple levels, as well as the development of methods for 
assessing the impacts of adopting particular strategies.4  
 
In the international arena, the multilevel governance or MLG approach has been used to 
examine the dispersion of authority across multiple jurisdictions.5 In their 2003 seminal 
work, Hooghe and Marks distinguished two coexistent types of MLG: Type I, 
represented as a vertical dimension, is based on federalist relationships between 
central government and subnational governments; Type II, represented as a horizontal 
dimension, is dominated by networks in which multiple independent, task-specific 
jurisdictions operate at numerous territorial scales.  The first dimension emphasizes the 
                                                             
3 V. Ostrom, C.M. Tiebout & R. Warren, ‘The Organization of Government in Metropolitan Areas: A 
Theoretical Inquiry’ (1961) 55(4) American Political Science Review, pp. 831-42. 
4 E. Ostrom, ‘Polycentric Systems for Coping with Collective Action and Global Environmental Change’ 
(2010) 20(4) Global Environmental Change, pp. 550-7. 
5 L. Hooghe & G. Marks, ‘Unraveling the Central State, But How? Types of Multi-level Governance’ (2003) 
97(2) The American Political Science Review, pp. 233-43. See also: L. Hooghe & G. Marks, ‘Contending 
Models of Governance in the European Union’, in A. Cafruny & C. Lankowski (eds), Europe's Ambiguous 
Unity: Conflict and Consensus in the Post-Maastricht Era (Lynne Rienner, 1997), pp. 21-44; I. Bache & M. 
Flinders, Multi-level Governance (Oxford University Press, 2004); L. Hooghe, Cohesion Policy and European 
Integration: Building Multi-Level Governance (Oxford University Press, 2006); L. Hooghe & G. Marks, 
‘Types of Multi-level Governance’, in H. Enderlein, S. Wälti & M. Zürn (eds), Handbook on Multi-level 
Governance (Edward Elgar, 2010), pp. 17-31; J. Pierre & B.G. Peters, Governance, Politics and the State 
(Macmillan, 2000). 
links between administrative units; the second deals with interactions between public 
and private actors. In the same article, they argued that the dispersion of governance 
across multiple jurisdictions is more flexible and efficient than the concentration of 
governance in one jurisdiction. 
 
The MLG theory encompasses fundamental aspects for understanding subnational 
diplomacy. The ‘multilevel’ aspect of the theory envisions subnational governments’ 
capacity to open the centre-periphery gate and cross the domestic-foreign divide; the 
‘governance’ part of the theory, in its turn, allows subnational governments to become 
part of daily international politics.6 The MLG theory, thus, accepts the ideas that 
decision-making competencies are shared by actors at different levels7 and that political 
spheres are interconnected.8 This scenario allows subnational actors to operate both in 
national and supranational arenas, creating transnational associations in the process. 
Subnational actors also try to influence policy and decision making at the international 
level.9 As a result, national governments do not monopolize links between actors, but 
are one among a variety of actors contesting decisions that are made at a variety of 
levels.  
 
With the input of geographers, the spatial aspect of the MLG approach was further 
developed to reflect the movement of governmental authority upwards (to regional and 
international organizations), downwards (to subnational governments, including 
regions and cities), and outwards (to international corporations, non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) and other private and quasi-private bodies). Empirically, the MLG 
approach was used to examine the implications of transnational interactions among 
world cities.10 
 
Since the mid-1990s, scholars have also been using the MLG approach to understand 
current trends in the development of environmental and climate change governance.11 
Normatively, MLG has become a response to the mounting complexity and multilayered 
nature of environmental problems.12 Analytically, the MLG approach helps to shed light 
on the various actors and scales involved in environmental and climate governance.13 
Consequently, environmental and climate governance is said to occur in an MLG process 
                                                             
6 S. Piattoni, The Theory of Multi-level Governance: Conceptual, Empirical, and Normative Challenges 
(Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 19. 
7 Hooghe & Marks (1997), n. 5 above. 
8 B. Kohler-Koch & F. Larat, European Multi-level Governance: Contrasting Images in National Research 
(Edward Elgar, 2009). 
9  Hooghe & Marks (2010), n. 5 above. 
10 E.g., Saskia Sassen explores the ways in which economic globalization and the emergence of new 
information and communication technologies have made world cities key nodes for cross-border 
networks and resource concentration. See S. Sassen, ‘Locating Cities on Global Circuits’ (2002) 14(1) 
Environment and Urbanization, pp. 13-30. 
11 See H. Bulkeley, ‘Cities and the Governing of Climate Change’ (2010) 35(1) Annual Review of 
Environment and Resources, pp. 229-53. 
12 See M. Buizer, B. Arts & K. Kok, ‘Governance, Scale and the Environment: The Importance of 
Recognizing Knowledge Claims in Transdisciplinary Arenas’ (2011) 16(1) Ecology and Society. 
13 Andonova and Mitchell identify a shift in the locus, agency, and scope of global environmental politics 
and governance across scales. L.B. Andonova & R.B. Mitchell, ‘The Rescaling of Global Environmental 
Politics’ (2010) 35(1) Annual Review of Environment and Resources, pp. 255-82. See also H. Bulkeley, 
‘Reconfiguring Environmental Governance: Towards a Politics of Scales and Networks’ (2005) 24(8) 
Political Geography, pp. 875-902.  
across multiple arenas of governance and at different scales, which includes large 
regions, subnational regions, municipalities and communities.14  
 
Among the various actors and scales, local and regional governments are presented as a 
crucial scale for tackling global climate change. Cities are significant contributors to 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. The Stern Review suggests that cities account for up 
to 78% of carbon emissions from human activities.15 Regional governments present 
different characteristics. Their position between the local and the national levels puts 
them in a privileged place to deal with environmental issues. In relation to the national 
government, regional governments have a comparative advantage in terms of knowing 
the needs and realities of their citizens, having the technical knowledge of 
environmental issues, and being able to adapt general policies to specific circumstances. 
In relation to local authorities, subnational governments encompass both urban and 
nonurban realities, a larger population, and have more significant budgets and 
responsibilities.16  
 
Transnational networks of cities are key components of MLG systems. Since the 1970s, 
subnational entities have joined together in transnational associations based upon 
common interests. These networks illustrate how cities can be ‘involved with something 
that reaches beyond their own boundaries’.17 In the climate realm, much of the attention 
surrounding local networks is associated with ICLEI – Local Governments for 
Sustainability18 and the C40 Cities Climate Leadership Group.19  
 
Transnational networks of regional governments in the climate sphere also exist, 
though so far they have received less academic attention. Happaerts, Van den Brande, 
and Bruyninckx studied two such networks: the Environmental Conference of the 
                                                             
14 See M. Betsill & H. Bulkeley, ‘Cities and the Multilevel Governance of Global Climate Change’ (2006) 
12(2) Global Governance, pp. 141-59. 
15 N. Stern, Stern Review: The Economics of Climate Change (Cambridge University Press, 2007). 
16 On climate governance in the regional (state) level, see B.G. Rabe, ‘Beyond Kyoto: Climate Change Policy 
in Multilevel Governance Systems’ (2007) 20(3) Governance, pp. 423-44; Selin & VanDeveer, n. 1 above. 
17 P. Newell, P. Pattberg & H. Schroeder, ‘Multiactor Governance and the Environment’ (2012) 37(1) 
Annual Review of Environment and Resources, pp. 365-87, at 372. 
18 See online at: http://www.iclei.org. 
19 See online at: http://www.c40.org. For studies on the participation of cities in climate governance and 
transnational networks of cities, see: H. Bulkeley & M. Betsill, Cities and Climate Change: Urban 
Ssustainability and Global Environmental Governance (Routledge, 2003), and M. Betsill & H. Bulkeley, 
‘Transnational Networks and Global Environmental Governance: The Cities for Climate Protection 
program’ (2004) 48(2) International Studies Quarterly, pp. 471-93. See also N.J. Toly, ‘Transnational 
Municipal Networks in Climate Politics: From Global Governance to Global Politics’ (2008) 5(3) 
Globalizations, pp. 341-56, and A.R. Davies, ‘Local Action for Climate Change: Transnational Networks and 
the Irish Experience’ (2005) 10(1) Local Environment, pp. 21-40. For an account of the participation of 
cities from developing countries in such networks, see: C. Holgate, ‘Factors and Actors in Climate Change 
Mitigation: A Tale of Two South African Cities’ (2007) 12(5) Local Environment, pp. 471-84; P. Romero-
Lankao, ‘How Do Local Governments in Mexico City Manage Global Warming?’ (2007) 12(5) Local 
Environment, pp. 519-35; J. Setzer, ‘Subnational and Transnational Climate Change Governance: Evidence 
from the State and City of Sao Paulo, Brazil’ Paper presented at the 5th World Bank Urban Research 
Symposium ‘Cities and Climate Change: Responding to an Uurgent Agenda’, June 2009, Marseille (France), 
available online at: http://tinyurl.com/SetzerWB2009. It should be noted that ICLEI’s CCP Programme was 
replaced in June 2012 by the Green Climate Cities Campaign. For studies on the C40 network, see: M. 
Acuto, Global Cities, Governance and Diplomacy: The Urban Link (Routledge, 2013). 
European Regions (ENCORE)20 and the Network of Regional Governments for 
Sustainable Development (nrg4SD).21 Their work suggests that while these networks 
represent regions vis-a-vis international organizations and influence multilateral 
decision-making, mostly they foster cooperation between subnational governments and 
stimulate policy learning.22 The R20 Regions of Climate Action is another regional 
government network.23 It was founded in 2010 by then Governor of California Arnold 
Schwarzenegger and other global leaders in cooperation with the United Nations (UN), 
aiming to promote local economic and environmental benefits.24  
 
Some scholars suggest these transnational networks of subnational governments foster 
policy learning and change.25 Others argue that transnational networks help local 
governments adopt GHG emission reduction strategies.26 Others, still, ponder, the actual 
impact of these networks on members’ actions has not yet been clearly established, and 
it is likely to be network specific.27 More broadly, these networks are said to facilitate 
the bypass of nation-states, and to apply political and normative pressures from 
multiple levels and directions.28 
 
Giving attention to the multiple horizontal and vertical interactions that promote 
coordination across levels of governance, the MLG approach successfully challenges the 
traditional state-centric focus of international relations literature. However, this lens 
still only offers a partial account of transnational interactions among subnational 
governments. In the first place, by trying to encompass the full myriad of political actors 
that operate across space, issues, organizational domains, and vertical and horizontal 
jurisdictional scales, the MLG literature provides an incomplete picture of the specific 
roles that subnational governments play in rescaling global environmental politics.29 
                                                             
20 See online at: http://www.provincie.drenthe.nl/encoreweb. 
21 See online at: http://www.nrg4sd.org. 
22 S. Happaerts, K. Van den Brande & H. Bruyninckx, ‘Subnational Governments in Transnational 
Networks for Sustainable Development’ (2011) 11(4) International Environmental Agreements, pp. 321-
39. 
23 See online at: http://regions20.org. 
24 See H.M. Osofsky, ‘Multiscalar Governance and Climate Change: Reflections on the Role of States and 
Cities at Copenhagen’ (2010) 25 Maryland Journal of International Law, pp. 64-85. 
25 M. Betsill & H. Bulkeley, ‘Looking Back and Thinking Ahead: A Decade of Cities and Climate Change 
Research’ (2007) 12(5) Local Environment, pp. 447-56; E. Gustavsson, I. Elander & M. Lundmark, 
‘Multilevel Governance, Networking Cities, and the Geography of Climate Change Mitigation: Two Swedish 
Examples’ (2009) 27(1) Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy, pp. 59-74; M.R. Krause, ‘An 
Assessment of the Impact that Participation in Local Climate Networks Has on Cities’ Implementation of 
Climate, Energy, and Transportation Policies’ (2012) 29(5) Review of Policy Research, pp. 585-604; R. 
Lidskog & I. Elander, ‘Addressing Climate Change Democratically: Multi-level Governance, Transnational 
Networks and Governmental Structures’ (2010) 18(1) Sustainable Development, pp. 32-41.  
26 L.B. Andonova, ‘The Climate Regime and Domestic Politics: The Case of Russia’ (2008) 21(4) Cambridge 
Review of International Affairs, pp. 483-504; Selin & VanDeveer, n. 1 above. 
27 Krause, n. 24 above. 
28 Abbott, n.1 above. 
29 Indeed, subnational governments are involved in a large number of transnational interactions that go 
beyond the types of interactions that are generally considered by the MLG literature. When engaging in an 
international environmental agenda, subnational governments promote at least six forms of rescaling. A 
consideration of this wider and more nuanced picture of the rescaling processes promoted by subnational 
governments can be found in: J. Setzer, ‘How Subnational Governments Are Rescaling Environmental 
Additionally, the MLG perspective places most of its attention on cities and networks of 
cities, without giving sufficient attention to regional governments.  
 
A richer and more complex picture of subnational governments’ international agenda 
can be gained by exploring the concept of ‘paradiplomacy’.30 Since the late 1980s, 
scholars drawing on international relations and federalist theories have developed this 
concept to specifically investigate the international relations undertaken by regional, 
local or non-central governments31. These include having representations abroad, 
conducting trade missions, seeking foreign investment, and entering bilateral and 
multilateral relations with nation states and/or other subnational governments across 
borders.32 More recently, with the growing importance of cities, attention is placed on 
‘city diplomacy’.33 City diplomacy is defined as ‘the institutions and processes by which 
cities, or local governments in general, engage in relations with actors on an 
international political stage with the aim of representing themselves and their interests 
to one another’.34 It has been argued that city diplomacy is driving the emergence of an 
influential urban international agenda led by mayors of major metropolises.35  
 
Secondly, the governance literature has made limited strides with regard to the legal 
and institutional basis for non-state actors’ international climate action. Rescaling 
processes are often taken for granted, with little or no consideration of whether the 
actors have a legal basis for moving across levels of governance. For instance, are the 
representatives of subnational governments legally entitled to meet foreign dignitaries, 
to sign memoranda of understanding (MOUs) with other subnational governments 
across borders, or to establish emissions trading schemes? The paradiplomacy 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
Governance: The Case of the Brazilian State of São Paulo’ (2014), Journal of Environmental Policy & 
Planning, (available online 28 November 2014).  
30 There is a substantial debate on the adequacy of the term ‘paradiplomacy’. Other terms suggested to 
describe the participation of subnational actors in the international arena are 'multilayered diplomacy' 
(B. Hocking, Localizing Foreign Policy: Non-central Governments and Multilayered Diplomacy (Palgrave 
Macmillan, 1993)), 'catalytic diplomacy' (B. Hocking, ‘The Woods and the Trees: Catalytic Diplomacy and 
Canada's Trials as a Forestry Superpower’ (1996) 5(3) Environmental Politics, pp. 448-75), and ‘sub-state 
diplomacy’ (N. Cornago, ‘On the Normalization of Sub-state Diplomacy’ (2010) 5(1-2) The Hague Journal 
of Diplomacy, pp. 11-36).  
31 F. Aldecoa & M. Keating (eds), Paradiplomacy in Action: The Foreign Relations of Ssubnational 
Governments  (Frank Cass, 1999); I.D. Duchacek, ‘Perforated Sovereignties: Towards a Typology of New 
Actors in International Relations’, in H.J. Michelmann & P. Soldatos (eds), Federalism and International 
Relations: Tthe Rrole of Subnational Units (Clarendon Press, 1990), pp. 1-33; A. Lecours, ‘Paradiplomacy: 
Reflections on the Foreign Policy and International Relations of Regions’ (2002) 7 International 
Negotiation, pp. 91-114. 
32 I. Aguirre, ‘Making Sense of Paradiplomacy? An Intertextual Enquiry about a Concept in Ssearch of a 
Definition’ (1999) 9(1) Regional & Federal Studies, pp. 185-209; N. Cornago, ‘Diplomacy and 
Paradiplomacy in the Redeﬁnition of International Security: Dimensions of Conﬂict and Cooperation’, in 
Aldecoa & Keating, ibid., pp. 40-57; J. Kincaid, ‘The American Governors in International Affairs’ (1984) 
14(4) Publius: The Journal of Federalism, pp. 95-114; S.L. McMillan, The Involvement of State Governments 
in US Foreign Relations (Palgrave Macmillan, 2012); H.J. Michelmann (ed.), Foreign Relations in Ffederal 
Countries (McGill-Queen's University Press, 2009). 
33 See Acuto, n. 19 above; see also R. Pluijm & J. Melissen, ‘City Diplomacy: The Expanding Role of Cities in 
International Politics’, in Netherlands Institute of International Relations (ed.), Clingendael Diplomatic 
Studies Papers, Vol. 10 (Netherlands Institute of International Relations, 2007), pp. 5-36. 
34 Pluijm & Melissen, ibid., at p. 6. 
35 Acuto, n. 19 above. 
literature, however, thanks to its basis in federalist theory, does engage with some of 
the legal/constitutional limits of subnational governments’ international agenda.36  
 
Further consideration of the legal limits of subnational climate action and of subnational 
engagement in international relations appears in recent legal literature on climate 
change federalism.37 Such legal considerations on subnational governments’ capacity to 
engage in the global governance of climate change can be further integrated into the 
MLG theory, adding a legal perspective to this body of literature. 
 
In summary, while the MLG literature has recently advanced the examination of the 
actors and levels involved in global environmental governance, two shortcomings have 
been identified. Firstly, this literature offers only a partial picture of the transnational 
interactions in which subnational governments are taking part. Secondly, there is 
limited consideration of the legal capacity of non-state actors to operate across scales. 
Addressing the second gap more directly, the next section examines the potential 
limitations imposed by international and domestic legal orders on subnational 
diplomacy. 
 
3. THE LEGAL BASIS FOR SUBNATIONAL DIPLOMACY 
 
Local and regional governments are increasingly active in the transnational climate 
change arena. Before examining the legal context in which subnational diplomacy is 
taking place, it is worth clarifying what types of activities are involved in subnational 
diplomacy. Although local and regional governments engage in a broad number of 
international activities,38 I suggest that these activities fall within two main categories: 
collaboration and coalition initiatives.  
 
In collaboration initiatives, local and regional governments collaborate with other 
subnational, national or international actors. In coalition initiatives, local and regional 
                                                             
36 M. Andrade e Barros, ‘Outlooks for the Legal Framing of Paradiplomacy: The Case of Brazil’ (2010) 7(3) 
Federal Governance, pp. 39-49; P. Bursens & J. Deforche, ‘Going Beyond Paradiplomacy? Adding Historical 
Institutionalism to Account for Regional Foreign Policy Ccompetences’ (2010) 5 The Hague Journal of 
Diplomacy, pp. 151-71; N. Cornago, ‘On the Normalization of Sub-state Diplomacy’ (2010) 5(1-2) The 
Hague Journal of Diplomacy, pp. 11-36. 
37 K. Engel, ‘Courts and Climate Policy: Now and in the Future’, in B.G. Rabe (ed.), Greenhouse Governance: 
Addressing Climate Change in America (Brookings Institution Press, 2010), pp. 229-59; D.A. Farber, 
‘Climate Policy and the United States System of Divided Powers: Dealing with Carbon Leakage and 
Regulatory Linkage’ (2014) 3(1) Transnational Environmental Law, pp. 31-55; D. Kysar & B.A. Meyler, 
‘Like a Nation State’ (2008) 55 UCLA Law Review, pp. 1621-73; R.K. LaMotte, D.M. Williamson & L.A. 
Hopkins, ‘Emissions Trading in the US: Legal Issues’, in D. Freestone & C. Streck (eds), Legal Aspects of 
Carbon Trading: Kyoto, Copenhagen, and Beyond (Oxford University Press, 2009), pp. 391-423. 
38 Criekemans, e.g., suggests that the ‘full spectrum’ of diplomatic instruments that regions can utilize 
encompasses seven activities: (i) political representation abroad; (ii) treaty-making power; (iii) entering 
agreements of a formalized nature (political declarations of intent and/or cooperation agreements, 
transnational contracts, and cultural agreements and partnerships); (iv) developing programmes of 
assistance and sharing of know-how (bilateral or multilateral programmes, programmes on cross-
boundary cooperation); (v) participating in multilateral frameworks and organizations (observing or 
participating in technical committees, becoming an associate member of multilateral organizations); (vi) 
participation in formal or informal networks; and (vii) developing a public diplomacy, both domestic and 
international. See D. Criekemans, ‘Introduction’ (2010) 5(1-2) The Hague Journal of Diplomacy, pp. 1-9. 
governments exert pressure over national and international actors. Moreover, the 
climate agenda drives local and regional governments to establish further coalition 
initiatives, and therefore to have stronger diplomatic roles. Within collaborative 
initiatives, local and regional governments enter agreements and MOUs, join 
transnational networks that promote information-sharing, and establish market 
initiatives with other subnational actors across borders. Within the coalition initiatives, 
they exert pressure over national and foreign actors, both domestically (in the agenda-
setting phase of climate negotiations), and internationally (participating in climate 
negotiation processes, through transnational networks or independently). 
 
This typology parallels a previous division of transgovernmental behaviour suggested 
by Keohane and Nye, in 1974, to explain the relations between bureaucratic subunits of 
national governments (e.g. between environmental ministries from two countries).39 
According to Keohane and Nye, transgovernmental coordination relations are consistent 
with the targets and intentions of top leaders, whereas transgovernmental coalition 
building involves situations where subunits stand against their administrative 
structures.40 The typology also relates to a recent theorization by Acuto, which 
identifies a two-track process through which cities engage in international relations. 
Acuto uses the example of the climate network C40 and argues that one track is 
represented by C40’s technical efforts to curb climate change, similar to what I call 
collaboration initiatives. The second track has a ‘cross-cutting lobby role’, which 
consists mostly of city diplomacy, similar to what I call coalition initiatives.41  
 
Both collaborative and coalition initiatives invite a crucial question: by engaging in 
subnational diplomacy, to what extent are local and regional governments exceeding 
their legal authority? As Blank suggests, the existence of two legal spheres makes the 
legal position of cities acting in the international political field ambiguous, to say the 
least.42 National governments increasingly permit and even encourage local 
government involvement in foreign policy. Yet, national laws may hinder cities in their 
diplomatic activities. At the same time, while international legal rules increasingly 
extend to cities, cities may not hold legal personality in international law. Similarly, 
Farber ponders that states’ attempts to deal with the transboundary implications of 
climate policies face doctrines that are ‘particularly murky’.43 The legal competence of 
local and regional governments to engage in international relations involves a 
consideration of the potential limitations imposed on subnational diplomacy by 
international and domestic legal orders. In the international legal sphere, local and 
regional governments hold no legal personality, whereas in the national sphere the legal 
rules applying to city diplomacy differ from country to country.44  
 
3.1. International law 
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In the first place, the sources of international law do not recognize subnational 
governments as possessing legal personality. In international law, only national 
governments are international lawmakers.45 Subnational governments are treated as 
mere subdivisions of states and have neither legal standing nor independent presence 
in formal international institutions.46 The international initiatives and agreements they 
establish with other subnational governments, or with a foreign national government 
and/or an international organization, do not fall under the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties (VCLT).47 Subnational initiatives lack the binding character of treaties 
or customary international law among nation-states. The initiatives they establish 
across borders are, therefore, soft law, namely guidelines, recommendations, 
coordinating measures and other instruments which are not formally binding.48 
Consequently, the agreements that subnational governments sign are limited by their 
voluntary nature. Subnational diplomacy, then, has no international legal relevance. 
 
Nevertheless, as Raustiala says, soft law instruments create a loose and adaptable 
framework in which information, ideas, and resources are shared: they are non-binding 
as a legal matter, but highly effective and flexible in practice.49 For example, in the past 
decades, subnational governments have established policies to enhance corporate 
transparency and reporting in the environmental arena.50 Their efforts to address 
climate change have achieved goals similar to those imposed by the Kyoto Protocol.51 As 
Levit puts it, lawmaking in an era of globalization is a bottom-up process, ‘a soft, 
unpredictably organic process that generates hard, legal results’.52  
 
Moreover, subnational governments are pressuring the UN to provide a clearer position 
on what role they should have in international environmental negotiations and in the 
implementation of multilateral environmental agreements. With the adoption of 
Decision 1/CP.16 of the Cancun Agreements, the Conference of the Parties (COP) to the 
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UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)53 recognized the need to 
engage a broad range of stakeholders, including subnational governments, for effective 
action on all aspects of climate change. Transnational networks of subnational 
governments contribute to this picture. City networks, such as the C40, aim to impact 
directly other spheres of global governance by influencing the dynamics of both 
international and domestic public mechanisms (e.g. organizing international meetings, 
lobbying central governments, and participating in international fora). In this new 
diplomatic scenario, local and regional governments started calling for the introduction 
of a new category of ‘governmental stakeholders’ among the accredited observers to the 
UN system.54 
 
3.2. Domestic legal order 
 
In the second place, subnational governments’ legitimacy to act internationally depends 
on the domestic legal order. What subnational governments can do internationally is 
limited by the constitutional competencies that they have been granted within their 
national contexts.55 From this angle, there are three possibilities: the national 
government explicitly recognizes subnational government’s international relations; 
paradiplomacy is constitutionally and/or legally forbidden; or the national constitution 
and the domestic legislation are silent on this possibility. 
 
Few countries have legislated explicitly on the international capabilities of subnational 
governments. Since 1992, France has allowed subnational governments to engage in 
international cooperation, and since 2007, it allows them to enter cooperation or 
development agreements with other subnational governments worldwide.56 In 1993, 
Belgium adopted the in foro interno in foro externo principle, which allows subnational 
governments to conduct international relations in policy subjects for which they are 
internally competent. Belgium also accepts representatives from subnational 
governments in national delegations for international meetings. Within South America, 
Argentina explicitly granted foreign policy powers to its subunits. The constitutional 
reform of 1994 introduced a ‘paradiplomacy clause’, which became a legal corollary of 
international relations of Argentinian provinces.57 
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Yet in a number of countries, the national government retains the exclusive power to 
establish treaties or international relations with foreign governments. As a result, 
attempts to forge interstate and international cooperation to address regional or global 
environmental problems face legal questions. In the United States (US) context, for 
instance, states do not have the power to enter into treaties. The US Supreme Court has 
already invalidated climate state laws that presented ‘a risk of disruption or 
embarrassment in foreign affairs’.58 The same can occur in relation to subnational 
attempts to forge interstate and international climate cooperation.59 Efforts to create 
such coalitions encounter constitutional challenges, as the federal government retains 
the exclusive power to establish treaties or international relations with foreign 
governments. The reason behind this is that in international relations, the federal 
government is expected to present a single or unified national position.60 When 
subnational diplomacy action is questioned, this is based on the US constitutional 
Treaty Clause (only the President has the power, with the advice and consent of the 
Senate, to make treaties), the Compact Clause (which prohibits states from entering into 
agreements or compacts with other states or foreign powers except with consent from 
Congress), the Foreign Commerce Clause (Congress regulates commerce with foreign 
nations), and the foreign affairs pre-emption doctrine (the federal government is the 
ultimate authority on foreign policy).61  
 
Despite this constitutional situation, the facts on the ground are at least challenging the 
conventional wisdom that subnational governments cannot enter into treaties. Just 
recently, the US state of California completed its first joint carbon emissions trade with 
the Canadian Province of Quebec.62 The two governments linked their cap-and-trade 
programmes on 1 January 2014, enabling the mutual acceptance of compliance 
instruments issued by each jurisdiction, and allowing the jurisdictions to hold joint 
auctions of GHG allowances. The first joint auction was held in November 2014, with the 
next joint auction scheduled for the end of February 2015.63 California has also held 
talks with the European Union (EU) about programme linkage.64 These developments 
are worth noting because of the constitutional issues they raise regarding the role of US 
states in foreign relations, and also because of the sheer size of California's economy 
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and carbon emissions, as well as the fact that California has often been a ‘first-mover’ 
among US states on matters of environmental policy. 
 
Moreover, the US State Department coordinates the interaction between states and 
cities with foreign authorities and attempts to limit those that might interfere with 
national policy while implicitly recognizing the legitimacy of others. Within the US State 
Department, the Office of the Special Representative for Global Intergovernmental 
Affairs engages with transnational networks of subnational governments, such as Sister 
Cities International,65 United Cities and Local Governments (UCLG),66 the C40,67 and the 
R20,68 to further the global needs of state and local officials.69 
 
Most commonly, there is an absence of national legal rules, or at least a weak domestic 
legal basis, with respect to subnational diplomacy. Despite this relatively weak legal 
basis, de jure principles can be tweaked by de facto practices.70 A key issue is whether 
the subnational action falls within an area of traditional state competence. If 
subnational actions violate the national government’s responsibilities for national 
security, defence, foreign affairs, or external borrowing, their involvement in 
international relations can be challenged before legal courts.  
 
Worth noticing, some variation is expected depending on whether the relation with a 
foreign authority is established by a local or a regional government. Indeed, the role of 
cities generally differs from that of other subnational units such as states and provinces. 
Cities engage more directly with the needs of citizens in a closer way, and generally 
have competences over local problems such as planning and waste management, while 
regional governments usually represent larger constituencies and have powers in fields 
that are connected with their territory. Also, it may be more difficult for the central 
government to monitor the diplomatic activities of local governments, in part because of 
their number and because their initiatives do not always require formal legal 
arrangements. 
 
In summary, legal problems arise when subnational governments undertake 
international diplomatic activities which deliberately or inadvertently challenge, the 
central government: that is, when subnational governments’ actions interfere with the 
ability of the federal government to speak with ‘one voice’ on foreign affairs. The next 
pages examine Brazil’s position in relation to the international activities undertaken by 
its federated units. 
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4. SUBNATIONAL DIPLOMACY IN BRAZIL 
 
Brazil is a federal republic formed by the union of states, municipalities, and the Federal 
District. The legislative, executive, and judicial branches compose the Brazilian 
government. The Brazilian legal system does not provide for international actions 
undertaken by subnational entities. On the contrary, the 1988 Constitution establishes 
that only the Brazilian federal government has the power to direct international 
relations.71 For instance, the section about the organization of the state establishes that 
the federal government is the sole sphere responsible for maintaining relations with 
foreign states and participating in international organizations.72 Among the 
prerogatives of the president of the republic is the relationship with foreign states73 and 
the signature of international treaties, conventions and other acts, subject to approval of 
the National Congress.74 Subnational governments, despite being autonomous legal 
entities within the framework of public domestic law, are not included within the 
category of subjects of public international law, and there is no legal provision allowing 
states to direct international relations. The Supplementary Bill of Law No. 140, of 
December 2011, confirms this by stating that the federal government should promote 
the country’s environmental policy in the international sphere.75 Brazilian scholars 
recognize that there is a 'clear inconsistency' in Brazil: despite the lack of legal 
competence, subnational diplomacy does take place and in some cases is quite 
significant.76  
 
In spite of the lawlessness implicit in subnational diplomacy, Brazilian subnational 
governments tend not to act contrary to the country’s foreign policy. Brazilian 
paradiplomacy is seen as a result of the decentralized federative architecture approved 
by the new constitutional system.77 If there was a real threat to federalism, the federal 
government could amend the constitution either to forbid subnational diplomacy or to 
extend to subnational governments the competence to enter treaties. In 2005, the 
Federal Deputy and diplomat Andre Costa presented proposition of a so-called PEC 
(Proposal of Amendment to the Constitution) to explicitly authorize subnational 
diplomacy. However, the PEC was rejected on the justification that the constitution does 
not forbid subnational governments from establishing international agreements within 
their sphere of competence.78 Behind this rejection also lies the idea that the 
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constitution could not be amended on this subject as federalism is an entrenched clause, 
or, a constitutional clause that prohibits any bill making alterations. By refusing to 
amend the constitution or enact other specific legislation, the Brazilian government 
arguably consented to evolving subnational diplomacy without explicitly sanctioning it. 
 
Gradually, the federal government undertook initiatives at the federal level to 
institutionalize subnational governments’ international relations. One of the first 
measures taken in this process of institutionalization was to rename paradiplomacy 
‘federative diplomacy’, a term that expressed the intention to decentralise the country’s 
diplomacy.79 That is, rather than a diplomacy that runs in parallel with Brazilian 
diplomacy, the term chosen by the federal government emphasizes the decentralization 
of diplomacy as a trend deriving from the government’s foreign relations. 
 
The next step was to create a space for this federative diplomacy within the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs. In 1997, under President Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s mandate, a 
Federative Relations Advisory Board (ARF – Assessoria de Relações Federativas) was 
created and regional representation offices were established in different states. ARF’s 
objective was to advise states and municipalities on their foreign relations. In 2003, 
under President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (Lula), the ARF was replaced by a Special 
Advisory Board for Federative and Parliamentary Affairs (AFEPA – Assessoria Especial 
de Assuntos Federativos e Parlamentares). AFEPA became responsible for promoting 
coordination between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the National Assembly and the 
subnational governments (states and municipalities) together with their respective 
legislative assemblies, helping them to develop their international relations. 
 
President Lula also created, in the same year, a Division for Federative Affairs (SAF – 
Subchefia de Assuntos Federativos), linked to the Presidential Office. This Division was 
assigned to help implement a broader policy of redefining the federative pact and to 
promote and support ‘federative international cooperation’ involving states and 
municipalities.80 This includes initiatives involving the Organization of American States 
(OAS), the Southern Common Market (Mercosur/Mercosul), cooperation with Italian 
and French regions, and other international affairs established by subnational 
governments.81 
 
The creation of a federative advisory body within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and of 
a federative international cooperation division within the Presidency confirmed 
Brazilian subnational governments’ legitimacy to engage in diplomacy. Both AFEPA and 
SAF recognize the transnational initiatives promoted by states and municipalities and 
aim to support them in this agenda. Both bodies participate in subnational 
governments’ initiatives in an informal way; there are no legal requirements or specific 
guidelines establishing when and how the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the 
Presidency should be involved in subnational governments’ international relations. The 
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response of cities and states was positive. By 2008, over 70% of the municipalities with 
more than 500,000 inhabitants had some form of paradiplomatic activity82, and by 2012 
almost all state administrations maintained an international agenda and an 
international relations structure.83 
 
Notwithstanding the efforts to adapt to the paradiplomatic reality and institutional 
apparatus that was created in the past 15 years, there are still a number of challenges to 
subnational international initiatives. The position of the federal government remains 
unclear84, and its relationship with subnational governments is not always harmonious. 
In addition to the legal domestic constraints mentioned above, there are also political 
and institutional challenges.  
 
The political challenges are related to the dissolution of the diplomatic monopoly over 
foreign affairs. Brazilian scholars writing on domestic public law still maintain that the 
federal government is sovereign and is the only entity entitled to establish international 
relations.85 The Foreign Ministry’s legal advisory board recently reiterated that ‘the 
federal government is the absolute master of acting and undertaking decision-making 
functions in the field of international relations’.86 The institutional challenges are 
related to internal barriers that subnational governments face when trying to undertake 
international relations. For instance, subnational governments might encounter 
resistance from the national government and not find adequate channels for 
establishing dialogue and consensus building with diplomats. 
 
These political and institutional challenges are related to weak guidance on the practice 
of subnational international relations and a lack of criteria for monitoring the 
implementation and success of internationalization processes.87 As a result, subnational 
international strategies are developed without focus or strategic or long term planning. 
The state of São Paulo is trying to change this pattern with its International Relations 
Plan for 2011-2014,88 which establishes three general goals that guide the state’s 
international activities, as well as 16 priorities and 54 goals, including foreign 
investment and loan targets and ways to boost foreign-language education in the state. 
This was the first instance in Brazil, and arguably one of the first in the world, of a 
subnational government establishing a comprehensive plan to act internationally. 
 
Such challenges can also be observed in recent climate initiatives in which Brazilian 
subnational governments are engaged. For example, in November 2008, four Brazilian 
states from the Amazon region (Amazonas, Amapá, Mato Grosso, and Pará), together 
with two Indonesian provinces (Aceh and Papua) and three US states (California, 
Illinois, and Wisconsin), signed an MOU to establish the first state-to-state subnational 
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agreement focused on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation 
(REDD+) programmes.89 This MOU resulted in the Governors’ Climate and Forests 
Taskforce (GCF), a subnational collaboration between 19 states and provinces from 
Brazil, Indonesia, Mexico, Nigeria, Peru, Spain, and the US.90  
 
In the months preceding the December 2009 UNFCCC COP-15 in Copenhagen 
(Denmark), the Amazonian states of the taskforce adopted a position that was not 
aligned with the strategy defended by the Brazilian government. In this case, a 
conflicting interaction between subnational governments and the central government 
became clear. Not only did they want to influence the national government, but they 
were also advocating an ‘Amazonian states position’, which consisted of supporting 
REDD and avoided deforestation mechanisms. This approach, however, was beyond 
what the negotiators could accept. President Lula, SAF, AFEPA, and the national 
negotiators met the Governors on several occasions until they formed a ‘Brazilian 
position’ that could be taken to COP-15 in Copenhagen. 
 
A central condition for a harmonious relationship between diplomats and subnational 
governments is that the different levels of government should not assume divergent 
positions. As acknowledged by Min. Carlos Eduardo de Ribas Guedes, the head of the 
Special Advisory Office for Federative and Parliamentary Affairs of the Ministry of 
External Relations:  
 
“when subnational governments have a different opinion and try to influence our position, as in 
COP-15, the coordination meeting allows us to agree on common grounds. We certainly 
acknowledge that there might be disagreement between the different levels of government, but 
divergent opinions should not reach the international community: there is only one national 
position and it will be voiced by the diplomats.91” 
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All in all, the institutionalization of subnational governments’ international agendas is 
not necessarily an endorsement of subnational diplomacy. To a certain extent, 
federative diplomacy is a way for the federal government to control – rather than to 
give independence to – subnational governments’ international agenda. So the main 
question is still whether subnational governments can act independently of the central 
government. That is, even if the national government genuinely believes in the idea of 
federative diplomacy, it envisions a decentralization via the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
not bypassing it. Consequently, the margin for conflict increases when subnational 
governments undertake an international agenda that goes against the national 
government’s position. Federative diplomacy therefore attends to subnational 
governments’ demand for their own international agenda, but it incorporates their 
interests into the country’s foreign policy without allowing direct action to be 
undertaken by the federated units. 
 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
This article analyzed one aspect of subnational governments’ engagement in the 
multilevel governance of climate change: their legal competence to undertake an 
international agenda. It first showed that the linkages established within environmental 
politics occur across scales (vertically and horizontally). Taking into consideration the 
concept of paradiplomacy, and the recent legal scholarly work on climate change 
federalism, the article suggested that the MLG literature still offers an incomplete 
picture of the legal capacity of non-state actors to operate across scales.  
 
By engaging in collaborative and coalition activities in the realm of climate change, 
subnational governments are moving across jurisdictional levels, breaking the fixed 
issue-areas and territories in which they traditionally operate. However, there are legal 
limitations when subnational governments move across scales. In public international 
law, subnational governments’ international agreements are soft law. In terms of the 
domestic legal order, subnational foreign-affairs activities depend on constitutional 
limitations established by each country. The international and the domestic legal orders 
therefore establish boundaries to subnational governments’ international relations, 
which have to be taken into consideration when examining their rescaling roles. 
 
In Brazil, the federal constitution does not provide for international actions undertaken 
by subnational governments. Institutionalization within the federal government was a 
way to recognize subnational diplomacy without granting carte blanche. The national 
government recognized the desire of subnational governments for greater participation 
in diplomacy and demonstrated its willingness to comply by establishing an 
institutional framework for federative diplomacy. This combined the national primary 
role in foreign affairs with growing subnational participation. However, rather than 
giving independence to subnational governments, the institutionalization of ‘federative 
diplomacy’ can be seen as a means by which the federal government expands its control 
over the international agenda. 
 
Although subnational governments lack legal personality in international law, and 
despite limitations within national law, the legal ground on which subnational 
diplomacy is based might be shifting. Climate change has offered subnational 
governments an opportunity to act across borders, and transnational networks are 
facilitating this process. The challenge that remains is how to reconcile central 
governments’ monopoly over international relations with the subnational interest, 
avoiding ambiguous situations where the legality of subnational diplomacy can be 
contested.  
